The Euro was locked into its current crisis twenty years ago by the Maastricht negotiators, who ceded authority to the financial markets by Featherstone, Kevin
blogs.lse.ac.uk
Credit: XiXiDu (Creative Commons
BY-SA-NC)
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/13/euro-maastricht-negotiations/
The Euro was locked into its current crisis twenty years
ago by the Maastricht negotiators, who ceded authority
to the financial markets
Mar 13 2012
The roots of current controversy around the current Euro crisis can be traced to the
1992 Maastricht negotiations that led to the common currency’s creation. Kevin
Featherstone argues that the rejection of neo-Keynesian ideas was fundamental
then, and finds echoes today in policy attitudes that make a return to growth even
more unlikely.
‘The past is another country’, said the English novelist L. P. Hartley. Twenty years
ago last month, the people who signed the Maastricht Treaty could not have
envisaged the kind of crisis that the Euro is going through today. Finance and the financial markets
certainly held sway in 1992, but instruments like credit default swaps were unknown, and the triarchy
of US credit rating agencies had barely got a foothold in Europe then. Nor could the policy-makers
have foreseen the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 that unleashed a banking crisis
not seen in generations, changing access to credit and heightening sensitivities to debt
sustainability.
So the rules set for the Euro in the Maastricht Treaty two decades ago are not the cause of the
current crisis. Yet they have certainly deepened it by ruling out conventional solutions, and they have
imposed a financial orthodoxy that many now see as self-defeating.
The Maastricht negotiators were certainly aware of the
challenge of creating the modern world’s first single
currency held across sovereign nations. Crucially, the
aspirant members of the new currency bloc displayed much
diversity in their levels of economic development and
performance, and they would have very different
vulnerabilities to changes of economic fortune. Yet, while the
negotiators talked of the risk of such ‘asymmetric shocks’,
they accepted a model that would deny them not only the
means but also the responsibility for dealing with them at the
European level. They elaborated a set of nominal
convergence tests, believing that real approximation of the
national economies was not necessary and could be left as
a long-term dream. Equally important, they ignored the
disparity between their own political systems in handling the
necessary reforms and adjustments to keep the Euro-zone
on the same path. Grossly inefficient government
administrations in some countries were ignored, and all
were assumed to be on a par in obeying the strictures of the
Euro.
Why was such diversity of condition ignored? There are two answers, one narrow and the other
broader. First, it was by no means clear that all member states would be able to meet the
convergence criteria and enter the Euro. The entry criteria were set in a reasonably inclusive
fashion, however, and weaker fiscal states like Italy and Belgium produced surprising turnarounds.
In any event, both France and Germany found it in their self-interest to fudge the criteria. Thus, when
Greece’s entry came to be decided – later, after the rest – fudge was the name of the game. This
was despite a last-minute German concern to insist that Greece be required to introduce serious
pension reform before it be allowed to enter, to alleviate its fiscal strain. In the event German
representatives backed down on the issue, which was to prove a costly mistake.
The broader foundation for neglecting the implications of diversity at Maastricht also had to do with
the 1992 orthodoxy to reject ‘old-style’ Keynesianism. A failed attempt at EMU (European Monetary
Union) in the 1970s had envisaged a European Union budget of up to 7 per cent of GDP and hence
a major ‘centre of economic decision-making’. But the Werner Report of 1970 was out of ‘synch’
with the then current thinking. So the pillar of ‘economic governance’ advocated at that time by
Pierre Beregovoy, the then French Finance Minister, and Commission President Jacques Delors
was over-ruled. There would be no European transfers of resources or bailouts to rescue states in
distress: no ‘automatic stabilisers’ as found in federal states like the USA. So then and later at
Maastrich the German ‘ordo-liberal’ philosophy was adopted instead, which asserted that a stability
culture could only be built bottom-up from within member states. States must create the best
environment for free market competition, with measures based on market principles of ‘sound
money, sound finances’. Such credibility was the prime responsibility of national governments to
maintain.
Hence the logic denied a European-level responsibility. This stance chimed with the rather derisory
opinion held of the European Commision by most national finance ministries in 1992. Brussels was
to be kept at arm’s length from economic policy decisions. And, if a constraint on national policies
were needed, this would be provided by the disciplinary effects of the new capital mobility evident
across the financial markets. The Maastricht negotiators were not the first or only ones to cede
authority to ‘finance’: the de-regulated financial services sector and the new European single market
were changing Europe as they negotiated. But, the effect of their consensus was to leave errant
states to be hung-out to dry.
When the financial crisis hit Europe in 2009, these provisions proved not enough. Current
discussions of the ECB printing money or of the creation of Euro-bonds to share the debt burden,
have been pre-emptively blocked-out. But, the ability to monitor – let alone manage – the crisis has
also been undermined. The ordo-liberalism that asserted national governments were responsible
for their fiscal positions also emasculated the monitoring that was possible from European
institutions: it led directly to the dodgy data that Greece reported in October 2009. The Euro-zone
has had to stumble towards the creation of a large emergency fund to help states in difficulty.
Institutionally, Maastricht did not address the leadership issue: and the crisis has been exacerbated
by division and uncertainty.
Today, Chancellor Merkel remains in the Maastricht groove: the new reforms mainly stress
punishments for Eurozone states guilty of bad behaviour. With the absence of ‘economic
governance’ also comes the continued rejection of neo-Keynesian options for returning to economic
growth. Austerity is the language of penalties for not abiding by ordo-liberal precepts of good-
housekeeping. History comes back to haunt us.
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